Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to have this opportunity to share my analysis on the U.S. national security implications of the AdministrationÕs new Cuba policy, and I commend you on calling this hearing on what is often a misunderstood threat to our national interests.

Last year, when the New York Times editorial board and others intensified their campaign for a unilateral-unconditional change in U.S.-Cuba policy, I published an essay titled: WWCD, that is, What Would Castro Do if the United States were to unilaterally and unconditionally end economic sanctions?

I argued then that, not probing how Castro would respond was an irresponsible omission since the formulation of U.S. foreign policy is often compared to a chess game in which every prospective move is analyzed with an eye to what the adversaryÕs counter move would be. A foreign policy move always seeks reciprocity.

General Raul Castro has now provided a comprehensive answer to my ÒWhat Would Castro DoÓ question.

On the 28^th of January 2015, speaking in Costa Rica addressing the III Summit of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), General Castro set his demands. Before the two nations can re-establish normal relations the United States must:

1. Unconditionally eliminate all economic sanctions.
2. Return to Cuba the Guantanamo U.S. naval base.
3. Stop all the transmissions of Radio-TV Marti.
4. Compensate Cuba for the supposed damages caused by the embargo- which Cuba estimates at 116 billion dollars and growing.
5. Eliminate Cuba from the U.S. ÒState Sponsors of TerrorismÓ list.

The General declared that ÒIf these problems arenÕt resolved, this diplomatic rapprochement wouldnÕt make any sense.Ó And that ÒIt would not be ethical or acceptable to ask Cuba for anything in returnÉ Cuba will not negotiate on these internal matters which are absolutely sovereign.Ó

With the GeneralÕs impossible preconditions now known, advocates of unconditional concessions to the Castro regime will likely double down and begin spinning all sorts of dangerous arguments as to why we should stay the new course.

We will hear that: General Castro was just laying out a starting negotiating position or that, since we tried economic sanctions for so long, should we not give this new policy some time?

And more troubling, we may even begin to hear arguments that Cuba may indeed be entitled to compensation from U.S. taxpayers, or that the naval base in Guantanamo is an unnecessary and expensive relic of the Cold War.

Distinguished members, when you hear these arguments, just consider for a moment how Mr. Putin and the Russian navy would love to have a warm-water port in the Caribbean of the quality of our Guantanamo naval base.

Consider also that if we further remove travel restrictions, thousands of small private vessels from South Florida will begin visiting Cuba on a regular basis and may return with hidden cargo. We can all use our imagination as to the nature of the cargo whether drugs, contraband goods, or human trafficking. Our overstretched Coast Guard would not be able to effectively monitor thousands of private vessels traveling regularly between South Florida and Cuba.

Given the long standing and close links between Cuba and Iran, this ocean travel possibility exposes our border security to new and serious vulnerabilities to terrorism and contraband.

Moreover, the PresidentÕs new measures will enrich primarily the Cuban military, and will not impede General CastroÕs close alliance with Iran, Russia or Venezuela. It is hard to discern how fortifying a totalitarian government promotes democracy.

The new Cuba policy has legitimized the Cuban military regime in the eyes of the world. By sanctioning an oppressive regime that violates human rights with abandon, the President has reversed our long standing support for democratic governance in Latin America.

Since the 1970Õs, U.S. policy toward Latin America has emphasized democracy, human rights, and constitutional government. Arguably, U.S. policy in defense of democratic governance has not been uniform throughout the world. But until recently, defending democratic values was our long established policy in Latin America. The gratuitous normalization of relations with an oppressive military dictatorship sends the wrong message to the continent.

Every Latin American would-be dictator now realizes that suppressing civil liberties in their countries is not an impediment to having a good diplomatic and commercial relationship with the United States.

Contrary to the argument of some that the new policy will help improve relations with Latin America, our implicit seal of approval of a military dictatorship further weakens American influence and prestige in the region. It encourages anti-American leaders everywhere to take positions inimical to U.S. interests as Cuba has done for decades. One unfortunate visual the new policy has conveyed is that, taking American hostages can be very rewarding.

Finally, General Castro, in order to secure whatever advantages he may be pursuing, may promise some minor concessions. But before embracing his military dictatorship, we should understand the General has made it clear that Cuba will not change its ways.