By:
I- Introduction.
The US/Cuba policy is
a classical example of a traditional United States foreign policy conundrum:
its interests as a world power and the
Most
The first inflection
point that followed the U.S. birth as a nation was the Monroe doctrine. It
established that Cuba’s geographic position was vitally important to U.S.
interests and stemmed from the desire to possess the island (originally a
Jeffersonian objective) or at least prevent a foreign power domination of Cuba.
The doctrine marked the debut of the United States as a power that saw fit to
define its regional area of interest.
The doctrine is the only long
range policy ever formulated towards Cuba. It was a classic national interest policy that
evolved into a watch and wait policy wherein Spain was seen as a weak power
that would be preferable to a strong one. Thus, throughout the Cuban wars of
independence, the U.S. declined to grant the Cuban patriots belligerent power
recognition. Essentially the United States was afraid that a weak Cuban state
would emerge and that a European power would covet it.
The Congressional
Joint Resolution authorizing U.S. intervention and setting off the war with
Spain was the second inflection point. It marked the emergence of the U.S as a
world power that dispatched an old European power in a matter of weeks.
The final text of the
resolution was resisted by the then administration in that it expressly
established the need for Cuba’s independence. Fairness triumphed, and it passed
anyway. Finally decades of conflicting and vacillating policy on the subject
were swept aside. The Platt Amendment, attached to the Cuban Constitution at
the U.S. request, was an expression of a national interests motivated by
strategic concerns. The United States was embarking on ‘The Panama Canal’
endeavor and it wanted a stable and peaceful Cuba, receptive to U.S. investment
and securely linked to it. Consequent with the thinking of the time, Cuba could
not be to allowed fall prey to another power that could block the maritime
routes to the canal. The Cuban naval bases were part of this defensive
position. The provisions of the amendment that limited Cuba’s foreign indebtedness
were part of the same thought as many European ‘gunboat’ interventions started
in order to collect debts. The clause that gave the U.S. the right to intervene
in order to quell internal unrest affirmed the protectorate. It was the third
inflection point, the debut of the U.S. as a nation with protectorates.
The history of the
amendment is too long to detail. Suffice to say that it created political
problems for both countries, and retarded Cuba’s political development although
it probably stimulated economic development. Eventually the abrogation of the
amendment took place in 1934. The United States was never comfortable in its
role of self appointed guardian, and after having emerged as a world power
following World War I, its regional area o influence was unchallenged. The
Platt amendment was unnecessary dead weight.
Following the
abrogation, mutual relations were conducted on a more traditional course
wherein commercial considerations and guarantees for investors were the main
issue. Throughout this period Cuba’s attitude presented a duality: at the
personal and nation to nation level, a genuine friendship and identification
with many American values; from the political class a mixture of admiration and
residual resentment for the amendment.
Into this situation
the Castro phenomenon erupted. In an
audacious move, Castro chose sides in the cold war and created a proximate
threat to the United States. The foreign power incursion feared by the U.S.
finally came to fruition. The fourth inflection point was unexpected and
different. It came through ‘internationalist’ socialism coupled to Castro’s
continental aspirations. This was a totally new formulation never before
experienced by American policy in this hemisphere particularly when the
instrument was a small and formerly client state. A ‘solution’ inspired on the Guatemala
template was devised showing that not much was understood and that
underestimation was alive and well.
The Bay of Pigs
failure marked the fifth inflexion point. It was the first widely publicized
defeat of American policy in Latin America and it produced two children. The
‘Alliance for Progress’ and the October missile crisis. The Alliance never
produced much progress nor did it stop Castro. It was another example of the
policy of ‘reacting’ to the circumstances without trying to understand the
issue at hand. Or worse yet, misdiagnosing the causes of the Castro ascent to
power, mistaking it for a social revolution of the masses and not a political
revolution that was then redirected to suit the ambitions of a new class.
The October 1962
missile crisis was the sixth and most dangerous inflection point. For the first
time in U.S. history a very grave proximate threat to national security took
place. It was ‘unthinkable’ that Castro would encourage Khrushchev and that the
Russians would take up the offer. The unwinding of the crisis resulted in U.S.
guarantees to the Soviet Union that Castro would be left alone and the Monroe
doctrine was placed in suspended animation. It was the seventh inflection
point. Several decades of Castro military intrusion in the hemisphere and the
world followed, with the bill footed by the Soviet Union. Finally, the cold war
ended and the thought was that Castro, no longer supported by the Soviet Union,
would regress to a ‘nuisance’ category.
And then the
psychological trip wire that appears to exist at the policy level of the United
States, took over: ‘Cuba is an errant ex ward come to age and given its small
size not a serious threat.’
The realities of asymmetrical
warfare should have rendered these conclusions obsolete but nonetheless they
persist. Castro has played this vulnerability of American thought to the hilt,
playing the ‘victim’ role while wining and dining more US legislators (and one
former president) than anyone in recorded history. In the meantime he pursued
another dangerous hemispheric agenda. This time it was purely homegrown. Its
two more obvious products are Chávez and Evo Morales both leaders of energy
rich countries. Throughout this period Castro managed to infiltrate the higher
levels of U.S. intelligence (witness the Ana Belén Montes case) and to
influence U.S. policy by masking his intentions through the use of the
‘enemy’s’ intelligence assets. Military assessments of Cuba’s capabilities and
intentions were heavily influenced by
Ms. Montes who was the resident ‘expert’ on Cuban matters. Not a bad result for
a ‘nuisance.’
II- Present Situation.
Embarrassing facts
tend to be set aside. This truism, coupled to the downsizing of historical
memory, serves well the effort of some business interests that demand a purely
commercial approach in the U.S. policy towards Cuba. Their argument in essence
is: Cuba is not capable of harming the United States so why don’t we conduct
business as usual? Presumably this would also include public credit. This idea
has been persistently pushed on congress through their lobbyists. So far the
executive branch, with information in
good part furnished by the Cuban American community and the Cuban American
legislators, has held to a policy that
basically preserves the status quo in spite of substantial pressure to
change.
For most of Castro’s
46 years the policy has been reactive, and at times sleepy or electoral. (Keep
the Cuban Americans happy and kick it forward for the next administration). The
American public has no appreciation of the events in the hemisphere and tends
to become aware only when crisis impends. Whatever debate exists is mainly
confined to commercial and political interests vs. the Cuban American
community. Academia is also involved and mostly on the accommodation with
Castro side.
A concept of where
Cuba, Cubans, Americans and Cuban Americans fit in the U.S. body politic and
Latin American policy is as absent as it is needed. Enough has happened in the last four decades:
Bay of Pigs, October Missile Crisis, Cuban Latin American intervention and
guerrilla operations in among others Bolivia, Venezuela, Argentina, Grenada,
and Central America. Add to this an expeditionary force sent to Angola, guerrillas
sent to other African countries, intervention the Middle East conflict, support
of terrorism and drug traffic, shooting down of American civilian aircraft. The
list is interminable. And now back to square one with Chávez et al.
This is not the work
of a single man, it is the work of a team dedicated to stir up trouble and push
an agenda. A team that will attempt to
cling to power and influence after Castro exits. The issue will not go away and
needs to be answered because Castro’s days are numbered, (he is not a healthy
man.)
In this void there are
in the United States two main currents of thinking that vie for dominance.
1- Produce permanent
and true democratic change in Cuba.
2- Make an
accommodation with the status quo. The accommodation advocates motivations come
in four brands:
i)
The American socialists (albeit
operating under other labels) want an accommodation because they like the
system including the total control of the education process. The fact that
Castro’s Cuba is drifting towards fascism is irrelevant for this group.
ii)
The ‘make a buck now crowd’ who
cares little about anything else and lack strategic thought. Usually they will argue
that trade and business will inevitably bring political change. True, but the
problem is that the thinking stops there. What kind of change, under what
circumstances, and with what consequences is the point. Cubans don’t need to
jump from the frying pan of Stalinist socialism to the fire of a post socialist
quasi fascism run by an enriched new class of ex bureaucrats. Further,
consequences in the hemisphere are totally absent from their thinking.
iii)
The immigration worriers. The fear
is that an impoverished Cuban population will take to the Florida straits
without a strong regime that will restrain them. This is a rather narrow and
cynical argument that has some short term validity but is a very poor long term
‘solution.’ Tyrannical regimes produce poverty. The strong regime
‘solution’ would perpetuate the problem, not solve it. A prosperous Cuba
will not seek emigration. It did not happen before Castro.
iv)
The Chinese model advocates. This
is really a more sophisticated version of the ‘make a buck’ now concept. It is
the same idea with some ‘intellectual’ trimmings. The Cuban American community
assumes the role of the overseas Chinese in investing in a post Castro Cuba
that continues to be ruled by the same group of top castroites who supposedly
will ‘evolve’ towards democracy. Not much effort is required to understand that
this Darwinian model will produce a new version of a Caribbean dictatorship
parceling out a country to its friends and partners. It presupposes benign and
beneficial ’evolution’ without providing a single cogent argument of why people
accustomed to do what they want with no moral or rule of law habits will
radically change for the better and not enrich themselves. Further, comparing
Cuba and the Cuban American community to China ignores several obvious facts. A
millenary culture in China that sustains the belief of many Chinese that the
Middle Kingdom is the Mecca of civilization and should again rule the world. A
nationalism that harkens back to that idea. 1,200 million people that must be
fed. A continuous history of absolute rulers. Vicious internal strife when
anything other than absolute power was tried. 11,000 kilometers distance
between Washington and Beijing. No history of a close relationship with this
country. Not a part of the American continent and its libertarian aspirations.
And finally, this model is still an unfinished book politically. Nobody knows
for sure whether Chinese nationalism will turn virulent or not. It would seem
that to the proponents of this ‘solution’ Cubans are not capable of restoring
their western traditions and culture. They must adopt a model that is alien and distant, work for small wages, have
limited liberties and be resigned to their lot. And to boot, meekly accept
their sad fate 90 miles from the greatest economy and democracy in the world.
This moronic and fatalistic idea requires a moronic and fatalistic people to
accept it. Cuba and the Cubans are not that, and neither is the United States.
The advocates of a
permanent and true democratic change (led by vast majority of the Cuban
American community) reject an accommodation with the Cuban status quo for two
essentials reasons:
i)
Common sense dictates a very
simple conclusion. The architects of disaster cannot produce a viable democracy
or indeed a safe and prosperous country that will be a good neighbor
ii)
Justice. After so many missteps,
the Cuban people deserve freedom and not a ‘utilitarian’ solution which is neither
‘utilitarian’ nor a solution.
In the heated climate
of political discourse logic makes an exit. The adversaries of the libertarian
approach try to paint most Cuban Americans as rabid advocates of ‘revanche’ or
alternatively as an out of touch remnant of a community wherein the younger
generation has a different point of view. The fact is that there exists a
remarkable continuity of sentiment that spans across generations, nurtured by
the fact that the exile community is consistently replenished by new arrivals.
These are not the
white Russians living in Paris that eventually died out. It is a veritable
living political body wherein the new arrivals, having in many cases suffered
more, are more anti-Castro in their convictions. Many are young and they are
heard by the Cuban American youth.
Another undeniable
fact is that the exile community, generously accepted in the U.S. under
exceptional terms, has responded in kind creating wealth and prosperity for
themselves and their adopted country. It has attained very high levels of
education and achievement in business and academia as well as politics having
adapted in record time to the system and sent four congressmen, one senator and
two cabinet secretaries to Washington, in addition to having contributed a very
large number of representatives to local government (another radical difference
with China). That Cuban Americans are industrious, educated and adept at
political activity is obvious. They need not reclaim properties in Cuba nor
engage in dirty business with an immoral new class to advance their fortunes.
They need not rely on so called experts to tell them what they are supposed to
think. They can and do think quite well by themselves. It is a prosperous
community that realizes full well how difficult it will be to turn Cuba around
and that practical ideas and not more ideology are the solution. Hard facts belie the ‘revanche’ smear
of a vindictive exile community with fixated ideas that those with non
libertarian or semi socialist agendas seek unsuccessfully to disseminate.
Cubans have thought things through and they know what they do not want, and
that is, more decades of socialism or a Caribbean version of fascism. The
American left doesn’t like this train of thought and the American ‘make a buck now
crowd’ doesn’t care. Well, we care and have refused for 46 years to sing in the
choir of prefabricated thought for a very simple reason: We have seen the
results.
III. Need to improve the present policy and
plan for the future.
The present policy includes
a very good component. It clearly states that Castro is a tyrant, must go, and
that Cubans deserve full liberty and not a ‘proforma’ democracy. It fits with
the President’s belief that true democracies don’t create wars but prosperity
and that the best neighbors are those with solid democratic institutions.
However, it lacks focus and
follow up. Congressmen and Senators from both parties continue to visit Cuba and
upon return continue to lobby for their political or commercial interests. From
time to time they propose disastrous legislation that passes both chambers and
eventually gets shot down in conference or through parliamentary devices
following veto threats. Recently, there was a change, and a number of proposals
were voted down in the House thanks to the hard work of Cuban American
legislators and to the success in disseminating information by dedicated
persons in the Cuban American community. But the fact that this must be done
shows the level of misinformation that is allowed to pass without official
rebuttal, or for that matter rebuttal by a group with impeccable credentials
and professional depth.
In a democracy,
legislators have the right to push forward their views but it is stunning that
matters such as the Ana Belen Montes case and Castro’s involvement in
strategically important countries such as Bolivia and Venezuela (with huge
energy reserves) and money laundering are totally out of the public political
discourse. Recently we have the money laundering scheme of many billions in
which Cuba was the main culprit and that resulted in $100 million dollar fine
by the Fed to a Swiss Bank. The issue reinforced the copious evidence of drug
trafficking at Cuba’s highest echelons. Indeed when one sees important Senators
with intimate knowledge of intelligence matters vote affirmatively on bills
that would be a boon for Castro, without a whiff of an explanation of why they
do so, it is fair to conclude that they don’t care, that they are posturing
politically, or that they are not sufficiently apprised by the administration
of the importance of the issue.
It is about time that
the Cuban issue is addressed in a consistent manner by people that have a
continuing interest in the matter.
At the executive level there is too much turnover. As a result Castro knows
much more about the U.S system than vice versa. Superficial opinions by self
appointed experts abound. In the meantime basic facts hardly reach the U.S.
public level. Indeed, for the American public Castro and his latest Latin
American ‘exploits’ are not only not news, Castro’s Cuba could well exist in
another planet.
Events have shown that
the policy of ‘benign neglect’ begets acute infection.
Lack of a focused policy can see
the island’s future government vest in a group of false reformers. Worse yet a
‘pragmatic approach’ of embracing a ‘reformed’ status quo, as proposed
by some business and political
interests, can give respectability to a system that can easily degenerate into
a ‘high tech’ rogue state dedicated to a slew of criminal activities 90 miles
away. Past history shows that the talent to do the latter is there. They have
been preparing for a long time. Underestimation again? Will it lead to another
inflection point?
IV- Action
Premise:
Nobody knows exactly
how the end of the Castro regime will come or how it will play out. In the
immediate aftermath many scenarios are possible and the governing U.S.
administration will have to play the hand it is dealt. Whether there is
internal strife with much violence or little violence, or some other result is
unknown.
What we know for sure is that
after a period of time economic and political realities in Cuba will take the
front stage and the process of creating a viable country and economy will
commence anew.
To help Cuba become a
prosperous country and a good neighbor will be a challenge. Absent war, for a
foreign policy to be effective a democracy needs to persuade and influence.
Traditionally, that is the sphere of diplomats but reconstruction of a
destroyed society is a different matter. No diplomat is blessed with the gift
of ubiquity. No person in today’s world has encyclopedic knowledge. Lack of an
intelligent and executable post Castro policy can have a disastrous result. A
different approach is needed to produce a good result.
A good result is a
post Castro Cuba that is a trusted ally of the United States and a great place
for investment. In a very confused Latin
American continent Cuba has produced, by force of circumstance, an important
segment of population (exiled and in the island) vaccinated against the evils
of absurd nationalism and socialism. A new and enlightened Cuban political
class can be a force for good in the hemisphere to the same extent that a
radicalized class has been a force for destabilization.
Cuban Americans
understand and want to cooperate in creating freedom and prosperity. Immense numbers of capable people in the
island want the same. There is a very substantial body of business experience
and sound professional competence in many specialties in the Cuban American
community. Many would gladly help for no remuneration. Moreover, many would be
happy to donate money.
In order to obtain a good result
the availability of this asset must mark present and future policy. But it must
be mobilized efficiently and not in a haphazard fashion.
A systematic effort to
channel and utilize these talents is lacking. Isolated studies, grants to
institutions, etc. are fine and can be useful but often lack the professional
focus of people that have hands on experience. Further they do not
encompass all the areas that must be dealt with. Writing about
privatizations and buying a state company and making it succeed are not the
same. The same can be said about many important issues such as debt
renegotiation, health policy, education, housing, legal and judicial matters,
etc.
The recent document
prepared by the U.S. government on help for a free Cuba is a good effort that
raises essential issues. But it is a list of things to do and good practice
recommendations that are well known to competent professionals. Although useful
it does not deal with the ‘how to adapt to a particular situation,’ nor
does it offer continuity and automatic update. It was completed
and filed away. But life goes on in Cuba. Every day things change. In any good
study there is a base of principles that have a permanence and validity that
transcend time. But when dealing with a society in motion guided by a
totalitarian mafia, static studies miss much because the mafia also reads and
adapts to circumstance.
The document explains
the U.S. willingness to help in the areas that it details. But to expect that a new and free government
in Cuba will know exactly what to do, and moreover have the political force to
do it is more than optimistic, it is unrealistic.
A liaison component that can
communicate in the same language, understand the psychology and have the
professional competence is needed.
It can be created
rather easily. As we said there is a very unusual reservoir of untapped talent
close to the island, appraised of the circumstances, fluent in both languages,
and interested in the topic. Further it can mobilize substantial capital
resources. Recommendation:
a) Create a permanent body to study the
Cuban post Castro reconstruction.
Semantics aside, from a practical viewpoint, it is a reconstruction and not a
transition simply because institutions are lacking and because in Cuba
there are very few organizations that can be trusted to function fairly and
efficiently.
b) This should be a private sector body mainly composed of Cuban or Cuban
American professionals residing in free countries with hands on experience in
different fields that would be invited or accepted as volunteers to contribute
their time for no remuneration.
Volunteers that are not Cuban and have specific skills would also be accepted.
Members would be reimbursed only for out
of pocket expenses.
c) The entity would be apolitical
and not connected to any particular institution in order to eliminate
suspicions of a particular point of view or agenda. A need such as potable water is a need and
period. The object is not to debate political philosophy but present solutions.
Divergent opinions, even on more debatable issues such as how to organize a
free country subject to the rule of law, can be taken care of in specific
recommendations. Such is their proper place.
d) The basis of membership would be professional competence supported by
proven past experience and not political preference. A formal written
commitment to dedicate time would be required. Suggested name: Professionals for Cuban Reconstruction.
e) Seed money in the form of expenses, exclusively for an administrative
staff, would be provided through a grant by AID or a similar federal body. To
sustain the body, contributions by the Cuban American community would be
encouraged and matched on a dollar to dollar basis by the grantor.
f) The entity would be charged with a continuing
revision of the Cuban situation. It should create a basic document for each
substantial reconstruction issue that details the present state and possible
solutions. Topics would cover all essential issues from the creation of
political and governing institutions to the bread and butter ones of
infrastructure, monetary and fiscal policy, etc. A comprehensive treatment of
topics would be a long list that nonetheless can be systematized and linked as
appropriate in order to produce useful results. State of the art thinking and
creativity would be encouraged.
g) Said documents would include an estimate of costs and possible ways of
financing.
h) This entity would operate with full transparency and also be charged
with presenting the Cuban reality in a professional and factual way to the
American public and to congress
i) More importantly, its work product and staff
would be available to a free Cuban government. It may ask the entity, if it so
wishes, to work with Cuban local experts that have the intimate knowledge of
where action is more urgent as well as of the nature of the problems.
The predictable result
in the United States would be to eliminate useless rhetoric and nonsense from
would be sellers of all things to a bankrupt country with no debt capacity, and
to present in stark terms the fact that only through new capital investments
can Cuba come around. Obviously this would not happen unless an honest
government, subject to the rule of law, was incorporated into the equation. It
would also show how absurd it is to try to base a Cuban reconstruction on
broken and inoperative models. Something good cannot come out of nothing, or
from people that have only produced poverty and despair. Cubans need to be
spared additional doses of ruinous ideology and dishonesty.
For Cuba, a body as
described would jump start the reconstruction process and provide a sounding
board for the Cuban government. It could react with much more agility to
provide advice and study on pressing issues, than the classic international
institutions that certainly will be involved but have many other priorities and
must follow their established procedures.
After so many missteps
it is time to do something different and base it on people that are volunteers
with no agenda. Cynics will say that this is too idealistic. Perhaps, but cynics
never created anything worthwhile. Politicians will point to the obvious
difficulties in getting this started. Perhaps, but dealing with a neighbor
rogue state is even more difficult. Creative action is required.
A. L. August 2005.